U.S. Airways $622-million
Boston Scientific Corp. $2.7 billion
Colonial BancGroup $575 million
Banner Corp., $71.1 million
Quantum Corp. $350 million
Lattice Semiconductor $225 million
If you can't see the entire diagram click here.
[Diagram from Grant Thornton]
Once Step One has been completed, companies should make various comparisons to ensure the reasonableness of their goodwill value. One technique is to value all reporting units to arrive at a value for the company as a whole. This helps to demonstrate that value has not been shifted from one reporting unit to another to skew the result.
Another corroborating analysis is to compare the Company's market capitalization (share price times number of shares outstanding) with the total value of the company as a whole, as calculated in the above paragraph. Generally, market cap and value of the business will differ. Reasons for this difference should be explained. Differences may include control premiums, liquidity factors, and non-public information.
More later on this.
Deloitte:
U.S.
Top 2008 Financial Reporting Developments
Highlights of the 2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments
SEC Comment Letters on Domestic Issuers
IFRS Reporiting
SEC Comment Letters on Foreign Private Issuers Using IFRSs
Model financial statements, checklists, and compliance questionnaires
Deloitte: Canadian Reporting Requirements
2006 Annual Financial Reporting Document Review
PriceWaterhouseCoopers:
Reporting considerations in the current market
US GAAP Pronouncements Affecting 2008 Financial Statements (includes developments to December 31, 2008)
Canadian GAAP Pronouncements Affecting 2008 Financial Statements (includes developments to December 31, 2008)
SEC speeches, including those at the 2008 AICPA/SEC Conference
Highlights of the 2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments
KPMG:
U.S.
2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments
IFRS
IFRS Disclosure Checklist
Illustrative financial statements
Canada
Focus on Financial Reporting 2008 Annual Update
Ernst & Young
AICPA National Conference on current SEC and PCAOB developments
BDO Canada
Accounting Update 2008
Grant Thornton
2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments
FAS 157 Resource Center
SEC
SEC Division of Corporate Finance Financial Reporting Manual--updated 2008 (formerly "Accounting Disclosure Rules and Practices")
FASB
Effective Dates of Recent FASB Documents
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Effective Dates for New Standards
IFRS Model Financial Statements from various accounting firms amd other sources
Fair Value: Reflecting, Not Causing, A Very Bad Year
While the overall fair value of financial institution assets declined in 2008, the SEC found that this was caused by the general economic downturn, and increases in credit losses and high default rates, not fair value requirements themselves.
Approximately 45% of financial institution assets are measured at fair value, of which three-quarters were held at level 2, 15% at level 1, and only 9% at level 3, the so-called "mark-to-model" tier. This distribution has held fairly constant over the course of 2008.
For a more extensive analysis of these asset classes, please see the Roundtable's brief on the subject.
Critically, though, asset impairment charges have grown significantly between 2007 and 2008-in 2007, impairment charges totaled around 1% of equity, while in the first three quarters of 2008, those charges had jumped to 8% of equity-a change that many have blamed on the requirement to fair value these assets (as opposed to holding at historical cost, where those impairments could perhaps have been minimized or pushed off).
However, the SEC found that:
"While fair value is used to measure certain assets such as trading securities and impairment losses on AFS securities, such declines in value were directionally consistent with the losses on the underlying loans and the current economic conditions, which impacted the value of these securities."
Case In Point: Bank Failures
Focusing on the most public example of the financial crisis, failed banks and financial institutions, the SEC found that "fair value accounting was not a primary underlying cause," instead; abnormally high default rates and credit losses, a decline in the overall quality of the asset base, and the resulting dramatic increases in "runs on the bank" were the main problem.
Looking at banks that failed over 2008 (and focusing on Washington Mutual, IndyMac, and Downey Saving and Loan, the three biggest failures), the SEC found:
Ultimately, the 2008 bank crises were similar to most other historic bank failures-caused by poor business decisions, unexpectedly high credit losses, and finally, "runs on the bank" that the institutions could not survive. The instruments may have been different in this case-but the mechanisms were not.
Investors: Fair Value Is a Useful Indicator-Don't Change It
Through a series of forums and comment letters, the SEC solicited a broad range of input on fair value-and with few exceptions, most investors and preparers support fair value generally (and FAS 157 specifically) as a useful tool, and feel that suspension would decrease overall investor confidence. A few included comments, called representative by the SEC, were:
"Fair value accounting with robust disclosures provides more reliable, timely, and comparable information than amounts that would be reported under other alternative accounting approaches."
[Joint Letter: Center for Audit Quality, CFA Institute, Consumer Federation of America, Council of Institutional Investors, Investment Management Association]
"We do not believe that fair value accounting was the cause or even a contributing factor to the current credit crisis. Fair value accounting did not create the losses, but rather reflected the market conditions by initially bringing to light the impact of poor lending practices and the resulting effect on the current lack of liquidity and overall crisis in the financial markets. Fair value accounting reflects the effects of a transaction on an entity's financial statements. It does not, however, drive the underlying economic activity."
[Credit Suisse Group]
Criticisms of fair value were mainly two fold. One group criticized the implications of fair value, mainly on regulatory capital, and here the SEC's basic response was that regulatory capital was a separate issue not really related to (nor appropriately governed by) GAAP rules.
The second criticism was on the application of fair value – mainly its role in illiquid or depressed markets. Here commentators agreed that more judgment and clarification would be helpful, and the SEC points to a series of coordinated guidance issued by the major standard-setters in late September, where they stressed that market values were not intended to be the sole determination of fair value in illiquid markets, and that other criteria could, and should, be incorporated into measurements.
Overall, the preparer and investor communities support fair value, and while they believe that modifications may be needed, they neither request nor desire systemic change.
What Should the SEC Do Next?
As required by Congress, the SEC considered (and broadly rejected) a series of possible alternatives to fair value standards:
The SEC did issue a series of tactical, and unsurprising, recommendations, including:
Conclusions: Nothing Surprising
The SEC's report is not surprising, and is completely consistent with their policies and statements over the last four months. Fair value, and FAS 157, will remain US accounting policy, and while they may (and probably should) be modified on the margins, the core principles will probably survive the financial crisis intact.
Oil and gas companies have for years said the SEC's rules were outdated and didn't take into account technological advances that allow access to more reserves.
The new disclosure requirements also require companies to report the independence and qualifications of a reserves preparer or auditor; file reports when a third party is relied upon to prepare reserves estimates or conducts a reserves audit; and report oil and gas reserves using an average price based upon the prior 12-month period rather than year-end prices. The use of the average price will maximize the comparability of reserves estimates among companies and mitigate the distortion of the estimates that arises when using a single pricing date.
Related technical documents:
The full 171-page text of the proposing release to update disclosure requirements for oil and gas companies
The 16--page concept release