SEC Comment Letter from Hell -- Segments

Always thought this was one of the worst comments to receive from the SEC, questioning segment reporting. This was a comment by the SEC to Verizon. See the comment below, and Verizon's full (20 page!) response letter here. The SEC was not quite done with them  and Verizon had to respond to a follow-up letter here and (ouch) a third time here.

Note 14. Segment Information

You disclose that you have operations in two reportable segments, Wireless and Wireline. We note on page 8 that you organize your Wireline service and product offerings by the primary customers targeted. In addition we note the remarks in your earnings calls of the impact on operating results of the FIOS platform. To help us understand how you applied the guidance in FASB ASC 280 in identifying your operating segments, please provide us with the following information:

● Provide your organization chart which identifies the positions, roles, or functions that report directly to your chief operating decision maker (“CODM”) and senior management team;

● Tell us the title and describe the role of your CODM and each of the individuals who report to the CODM;

● Identify for us each of the operating segments you have determined in accordance with FASB ASC 280;

● Identify and describe the role of each of your segment managers;

● Tell us how often the CODM meets with his/her direct reports, the financial information the CODM reviews to prepare for those meetings, the financial information discussed in those meetings, and who attends those meetings;

● Describe the information regularly provided to the CODM and tell us how frequently it is prepared;

● Describe the information regularly provided to the Board of Directors and tell us how frequently it is prepared;

● Describe the information about Wireline’s product and service offerings that are provided to the CODM, tell us whether there are managers accountable for the product and service offerings, and if so, tell us who they are accountable to;

● Explain how budgets are prepared, who approves the budget at each step of the process, the level of detail discussed at each step, and the level at which the CODM makes changes to the budget;

● Describe the level of detail communicated to the CODM when actual results differ from budgets and who is involved in meetings with the CODM to discuss budget-to-actual variances; and,

● Describe the basis for determining the compensation of the individuals that report to the CODM.

FASB, IASB Can't Agree on Financial Instruments Accounting

YOU MIGHT have long suspected it, but now it's official: the IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board have failed to develop a common financial instruments accounting standard. We have no convergence.

The reality about the lack of a single asset impairment model emerged during a 23 January IASB meeting. It leaves preparers playing piggy in the middle between the competing IFRS and US GAAP models.

Speaking at the meeting, Hans Hoogervorst, chairman of the IASB, said the two boards would meet later this year "once the two models are completely clear". Regulators, he explained, have the option of imposing "additional disclosures" in order to bridge the gap.

Hoogervorst, a former Dutch securities regulator and finance minister, added: "But we cannot let the preparers pay the price for the two boards not getting completely converged."

On 20 February there was worse to come. On the parallel effort to finalise the board's approach to classification and measurement, Hoogervorst was forced to concede: "What can we say? A lot of work has been done for nothing, it seems."

IASB member Patrick Finnegan was equally blunt in his assessment: "I would just observe the same thing. I joined this board with a full expectation that there were great aspirations for global convergence in three or four major areas. ... It is a terrible disappointment, in my opinion, for global investors.

"I'm not quite sure what more we can do if the two boards continue to work the problem ... but the FASB has decided not to continue with the current IFRS 9 proposed work plan that we developed, and unfortunately that's the way it is."

The board also voted to fix a new effective date for IFRS 9, Financial Instruments, of 1 January 2018. IASB members were reluctant to delay the standard, or make further changes to it, pending decisions on the linked insurance contracts literature.

Later that same meeting, staff reported that the FASB will almost certainly reject two central features of the IFRS 9 classification and measurement approach - the business model and the contractual cash flow assessments for amortised cost.

So how did it come to this? The IASB embarked on its project to replace IAS 39 in early 2009. It is possible to distill any number of motivations and drivers for the project: to respond to the financial crisis; to reduce complexity; to address the too-much too-late criticism of the IAS 39 incurred-loss impairment model.

The project began under the chairmanship of Sir David Tweedie, and glancing back at an official IASB project summary document from 2009, a fully-fledged classification and measurement, impairment and hedging model was supposed to be in place by the final quarter of 2010.

As is now plain to see, the board failed. In 2009, it issued the first completed phase of IFRS 9, which dealt with the classification and measurement of financial assets. It followed this in 2010 with a further module addressing financial liabilities and the fair value option.

In its 2013 iteration, the standard has acquired a new hedging model. This approach to hedging is something of a marmite experience. On the one hand, its supporters claim it will make hedge accounting available in more situations; its critics point to its complexity.

Also in 2013, the board put out proposals to add a new category - fair value through OCI [other comprehensive income] - to IFRS 9. Redeliberation of those proposals is now complete and the IASB has confirmed it will include the FVOCI category alongside fair value and amortised cost.

Since 2009, the standard has also featured a presentational option that allows entities to book gains and losses on fair value holdings of equity investments in OCI. And impairment? Well, the board published its first proposals in November 2009 and followed this with a so-called supplementary document in January 2011. The 2011 document marked the high-water mark of the convergence drive with the FASB.

From that point onwards, what was supposed to be a convergence effort degenerated into a religious war. If the pre-crisis years had been marked out by the clash of fair value and amortised cost, the new battle lines were between 12-months initial loan loss allowance and the FASB's preference for full lifetime expected losses on initial recognition.

And it was here that the convergence effort truly floundered. But as insurmountable though the technical challenges of two competing financial instruments models might appear, there is a much bigger issue: politics.

In recent weeks, the European Parliament has shown an increased willingness to challenge the IASB, even going so far as to propose linking funding for the IASB's activities to specific outcomes.

Separately, the G20 nations have urged the two boards to come up with a single financial instruments model. At some point in time, Hoogervorst is going to have a very awkward conversation with his political masters.

by Stephen Bouvier at Financial Director

FASB vs IASB: Split on Lease Accounting

The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) failed to reach a consensus for new lease accounting guidance Wednesday but vowed to continue working together in pursuit of consistency.

During two days of meetings at FASB’s headquarters in Norwalk, Conn., the boards failed to reach common answers on key areas of lessee and lessor accounting. In particular, the IASB favored a single approach for lessees for recognition of all leases, while FASB voted for a dual-recognition approach for lessees, depending on the type of lease.

The boards issued a joint statement saying they had agreed on areas such as lease term and short-term leases. The boards also pledged to continue working together on the standard.

“While differences remain, most notably in their preferred approaches to expense recognition, the boards are committed to working together to minimize these differences and to creating greater transparency around lease transactions for the benefit of investors worldwide,” the boards said.

The boards are attempting to create a converged standard that would eliminate a hidden liability for lessees by bringing leases onto corporate balance sheets. But they have struggled to agree on how to do it.

No consensus for lessee accounting

IASB members this week expressed a preference for lessees to account for all leases as the purchase of a right-of-use asset on a financed basis. In this “Type A” approach, a lessee would recognize amortization of the right-of-use asset separately from the interest on the lease liability for all leases.

FASB members preferred a dual-recognition approach for lessees that would use a Type A interest-and-amortization method for leases classified as capital leases under existing guidance, and a “Type B” single, straight-line lease expense for operating leases.

But there may still be a chance for convergence on this issue. FASB Chairman Russell Golden asked the FASB staff to work with the IASB staff to conduct research that would help the boards understand the effects of a possible exception that would permit preparers not to apply the proposed standard’s requirements to leases of small, nonspecialized assets.

The IASB voted for the so-called small-ticket exception, while FASB voted against it. Golden asked for the staff research in hopes that a better understanding of the exception could lead to convergence, which could cause the boards to agree on a preferred method of expense recognition.

FASB member Tom Linsmeier said he would be more inclined to consider the Type A-only approach for lessees if the boards abandon the small-ticket exception.

Sticking point for lessor accounting

On lessor accounting, meanwhile, the boards agreed to keep standards similar to current guidance but couldn’t agree on one important detail. They agreed that lessors should classify their leases as Type A or Type B based on whether the lease is effectively a financing or a sale rather than an operating lease.

But the IASB preferred to make that determination by assessing whether the lessor transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership of the underlying asset.

FASB preferred to make the leases guidance consistent with the requirements for a sale in the soon-to-be-issued revenue recognition standard. FASB’s approach would preclude recognition of selling profit and revenue at lease commencement for any Type A lease that does not transfer control of the underlying asset to the lessee.

The core principle of the new revenue recognition standard will be that revenue should be recognized to depict a transfer of promised goods or services to the customer.

Despite the disagreement on lessor accounting, some IASB members said they could accept the FASB approach, with IASB Chairman Hans Hoogervorst holding a “swing vote” that Golden suggested could move the lessor accounting decision to a converged answer in the future.

Before the boards parted, Golden thanked IASB members and said the boards ought to work together on the definition of a lease, disclosures, and other aspects of the leases proposal.

“We will continue to work together to improve accounting in this area, to continue to meet our objective,” Golden said, “and I hope to continue to minimize any differences.”

The boards have been working since 2006 to come to agreement on a leases standard. Their second exposure draft on the topic, issued in 2013, caused many preparers and some investors to question the benefits of the information—and the costs—the proposal would have generated.

By Ken Tysiac at JofA

Can Companies Smooth-Talk Investors?

Investors Prove Wise at Judging Self-Serving Earnings Explanations

Investors have proven to be sophisticated enough to dismiss implausible explanations from companies of their quarterly earnings results, according to a new study.

For example, a utility company might attribute their lower earnings to “warm weather and higher propane products costs,” while an insurance company might explain a good quarter by touting its “continued efforts on cost containment and operational efficiencies.” Self-serving attributions such as these, which typically blame outside factors for negative developments and claim that their own internal initiatives led to positive results, are a traditional part of corporate earnings reports and press releases. But that doesn’t mean investors generally believe them.

According to a new study in The Accounting Review, a journal of the American Accounting Association, market response to self-serving attributions depends in large part on two key tests of plausibility—how badly the company’s industry peers are doing and what the study calls “commonality,” the extent to which market or industry forces drive a company’s earnings.

The difference proved to be dramatic when those two key tests were applied to the 94 companies in the study, which was conducted by Michael D. Kimbrough of the University of Maryland and Isabel Yanyan Wang of Michigan State University. Firms with average positive earnings surprises who made the highest-plausibility attributions had three-day above-market returns of 4.77 percent on average, whereas those that offered the lowest-plausibility reasons actually averaged a slight decline of 0.79 percent. Meanwhile, among firms with average negative surprises, those with the lowest-plausibility attributions sustained average declines of 5.11 percent, while those with the highest-probability excuses had declines of only 1.42 percent.

“Firms which provide defensive attributions to explain earnings disappointments experience less severe market penalties when 1) more of the their industry peers also release bad news, and 2) their earnings share higher commonality with industry- and market-level earnings,” said the paper. “On the other hand, firms that provide enhancing attributions to explain good earnings news reap greater market rewards when 1) more of their industry peers release bad news, and 2) their earnings shares lower commonality with industry- and market-level earnings.”

 “Collectively, our results suggest that investors neither completely ignore seemingly self-serving attributions nor accept them at face value, but use industry- and firm-specific information to assess their plausibility,” the professors added. “Further analyses reveal that investors’ use of industry peer performance and earnings commonality information appears justified because investors’ perceptions are consistent with the association between the plausibility measures and the ex post actual persistence of earnings surprises.”

In sum, “investors are somewhat sophisticated when interpreting these narrative disclosures,” Kimbrough and Wang wrote:

“Our findings ought to be of value to both investors and corporate leaders,” said Wang in a statement. “Hopefully it will disabuse those executives who are counting on the naiveté of investors to let them get away with empty words or phony excuses in their public communications. For investors, it provides standards they will need to meet to keep up with the investment community at large.”

“The tools needed to apply those standards are certainly available to institutional investors, even though determining commonality is probably beyond the reach of individual stock-pickers,” said Kimbrough. “Still, even they should have the means to stack up the claims of a given company against its industry peers, which can go a long way in assessing the plausibility of the firm's performance narrative.”

The study's findings are based on an analysis of press releases and earnings reports of 94 randomly chosen firms, a roughly equal mix of small, medium and large, over a seven-year period. Sufficient data was obtained for a total of 1,790 firm quarters, 1,023 of which featured self-serving attributions and 767 of which did not. The self-serving classification was assigned to quarters when companies attributed their success in meeting or beating consensus forecasts to internal factors, such as management strategies or introduction of new products, or blamed a negative earnings surprise on external factors, such as bad weather or rising costs or regulatory actions. Firm-years in the self-serving category featured at least one such attribution and an average of three to four in a given earnings press release.

The authors found a significant relationship between the plausibility of self-serving attributions, as determined by industry performance and commonality, and the market-adjusted cumulative return of firms' stocks in the three days centered on earnings announcements. In reaching that conclusion, they controlled for an array of factors likely to affect the market’s response to earnings announcements, including the size of companies, the volatility of their stock, and their book-to-market ratio.

What kind of companies are likely to issue suspect attributions? Preliminary evidence suggests, in the words of the study, “Firms which provide less plausible attributions are larger and have higher likelihood of insider trading around earnings announcements, higher analyst following, higher institutional ownership, higher return volatility, and lower book-to-market ratio. These findings imply that managers with insider trading incentives and those facing greater capital market scrutiny are more likely to offer seemingly self-serving attributions even if they lack plausibility, consistent with the ‘opportunistic behavior’ view of capital markets.”

This view, according to the paper, finds “that capital-market scrutiny combined with the linking of manager compensation with stock prices creates pressure for managers to prop up prices by biasing financial reporting. To the extent capital-market pressure is greater for firms with higher analyst following and/or institutional ownership, the ‘opportunistic behavior’ argument suggests that greater analyst following and/or institutional ownership may increase managers’ tendency to provide implausible attributions to either mitigate market reactions to negative earnings surprises or to increase market rewards to positive surprises.”

Still, given the hazards of implausible attributions, as revealed by the new study, why would managers make them? It’s a matter of what they believe, Wang and Kimbrough wrote. “If managers believe there is a chance that investors might be persuaded by their implausible seemingly self-serving attributions, they are more likely to offer them even if ex post it turns out that investors can see through them.”

This article is by Michael Cohn in Accounting Today. The study, “Are Seemingly Self-Serving Attributions in Earnings Press Releases Plausible? Empirical Evidence,” appears in the March/April issue of The Accounting Review, published six times a year by the American Accounting Association.

What have IASB and FASB convergence efforts achieved?

What have IASB and FASB convergence efforts achieved?


Paul Pacter CPA, Ph.D. served as a member of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) from July 2010 to December 2012. At the end of his term on the Board, he wrote the following article.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this opinion piece, former International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) member Paul Pacter describes the accomplishments of the convergence project undertaken in 2002 by the IASB and FASB. He says many standards have converged, and IFRS have been improved as a result of the process.

On a standard-by-standard basis, results of convergence have been mixed, Pacter says. Some standards have been improved. Some have not changed because the boards couldn’t agree on a converged solution. And a few—revenue recognition, leases, and financial instruments—remain under development.

According to Pacter, although progress has been made through convergence, adoption of IFRS for U.S. financial reporting is the ultimate goal. He says adoption is the best approach for any jurisdiction.

For nearly 40 years, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), have been working to develop a set of high-quality, understandable, and enforceable International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to serve equity investors, lenders, creditors, and others in globalized capital markets. When the IASB took over from the IASC in 2001, few countries had adopted International Accounting Standards (as IFRS were then called) even for cross-border public sales of securities, let alone for domestic public companies.

That all changed—and quite dramatically—with two events. First, in 2000, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) endorsed IFRS for cross-border securities offerings in the world’s capital markets. Then, in 2002, the European Union made the bold decision to require IFRS for all companies listed on a regulated European stock exchange starting in 2005. Those events started a snowball rolling, to the point where today roughly 100 countries require IFRS or a national word-for-word equivalent for all or most listed companies.

Almost from the outset, a key goal of the IASB and the IFRS Foundation, under which the IASB operates, has been to bring the United States on board. In a plenary address at the World Congress of Accountants in 2002, Paul Volcker, the first chairman of the Foundation’s trustees, said: “I do not think it reasonable today, if it ever was, to take the position that U.S. GAAP should, de facto, be the standards for the entire world. Rather, the International Accounting Standards Board, whose oversight trustees I chair, is now working closely with national standard setters throughout the world to develop common solutions to the accounting challenges of the day. The aim is to find a consensus on clearly defined principles, and I am delighted that the American authorities appear sympathetic to that objective.”

In October 2002, the IASB and FASB signed a memorandum of understanding that has come to be known as the “Norwalk Agreement.” The two boards pledged to use their best efforts to (a) make their existing financial reporting standards “fully compatible as soon as is practicable” and (b) “to coordinate their future work programs to ensure that once achieved, compatibility is maintained.” “Fully compatible” was generally understood to mean that compliance with U.S. GAAP would also result in compliance with IFRS. That is, the standards would be aligned though not identical.

With the Norwalk Agreement, the boards launched a series of both short-term and longer-term convergence projects aimed at eliminating differences in the two sets of standards. The two boards agreed that where either IFRS or U.S. GAAP had the clearly preferable standard, the other board would adopt that standard. And where both boards’ standards needed improvement, the boards would work jointly on an improved standard.

The Norwalk Agreement has been updated several times since 2002, but always with the objective of two sets of standards that were converged in principle if not in words. The IFRS-U.S. GAAP convergence approach has been repeatedly endorsed by global financial leaders such as the G-20 as an important step on the path toward a single set of global accounting standards.

In November 2007 an important milestone was achieved toward use of IFRS in the United States when the SEC eliminated the requirement that a foreign issuer using IFRS must present a reconciliation of IFRS measures of profit or loss and owner’s equity to amounts that would have been reported under U.S. GAAP. In their comment letter on the SEC proposal that led to removal of the reconciliation, FASB and the Financial Accounting Foundation wrote:

Investors would be better served if all U.S. public companies used accounting standards promulgated by a single global standard setter as the basis for preparing their financial reports. This would be best accomplished by moving U.S. public companies to an improved version of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

So, where are we today after 10 years of convergence work? Some convergence projects have been completed successfully as envisioned—aligned principles even if the words differed. Others have been completed with partial success—some progress toward converged standards, but some differences remain. And some convergence projects either were discontinued or resulted in different IASB and FASB standards because, in the end, the two boards just could not agree. Some convergence projects continue to this day, including such major projects as revenue recognition, leases, and financial instruments.

At this point, it is reasonable to sit back and ask two fundamental questions about each of those convergence projects:

1. Have IFRS and U.S. GAAP been converged?

2. Even if convergence was not successfully achieved, has IFRS been improved?

The accompanying table, “Results of Convergence,” sets out my admittedly subjective views about the success of convergence and the resulting improvements to IFRS for each of the projects listed in the various agreements between the IASB and FASB. As a final thought, I would add that convergence may have been the most realistic way to initiate the use of IFRS in the United States, but such an arrangement is not sustainable in the long term. Rather, the best approach for any jurisdiction is outright adoption of IFRS. As the trustees of the IFRS Foundation said recently in the report of their 2011 Strategy Review:

As the body tasked with achieving a single set of improved and globally accepted high quality accounting standards, the IFRS Foundation must remain committed to the long-term goal of the global adoption of IFRSs as developed by the IASB, in their entirety and without modification. Convergence may be an appropriate short-term strategy for a particular jurisdiction and may facilitate adoption over a transitional period. Convergence, however, is not a substitute for adoption. Adoption mechanisms may differ among countries and may require an appropriate period of time to implement but, whatever the mechanism, it should enable and require relevant entities to state that their financial statements are in full compliance with IFRSs as issued by the IASB.

Adoption is the only way to achieve a single set of global financial reporting standards—an objective that both the IASB and FASB have publicly endorsed on many occasions.

Click here to read "Results of Convergence: A Look at the Outcome of Key Joint IASB/FASB Projects"

Disclosure Overload: FASB Project Comments

A lot of recent commentary exists on the subject of disclosure overload.

 

Recently the FASB has begun to focus on this topic. "Streamlining Disclosures" has become subject of various initiatives, including a recent round-table discussions this conducted by FASB and the Center for Audit Quality.

 

FASB has also initiated a Disclosure Framework project "to improve the effectiveness of disclosures in notes to financial statements by clearly communicating the information that is most important to users of each entity’s financial statements. Although reducing the volume of notes to financial statements is not the primary focus, the Board hopes that a sharper focus on important information will result in reduced volume in most cases."

 

"Boilerplate" and non-material disclosure have been said to be "noise" that obscures the real information that readers of financial information really need.

 

FASB published an Invitation to Comment (ITC) on this topic last July 12. They asked stakeholders to comment on whether and how disclosures in the footnotes to financial statements can be made more effective. The comment period ended Nov. 16.

Some of the questions:

• Do the decision questions in this chapter and the related indicated disclosures encompass all of the information appropriate for notes to financial statements that is necessary to assess entities’ prospects for future cash flows?
• Do any of the decision questions or the related indicated disclosures identify information that is not appropriate for notes to financial statements or not necessary to assess entities’ prospects for future cash flows?

Commentors said unnecessary disclosures can prevent users from finding the information they need, obscure the real information and waste prepares' time, money, and create undesirable environmental outcomes, i.e. too much paper.  

The FASB received 83 comment letters. Some comments: 

 

• Issuers should only provide relevant disclosures
• Disclosures should have a narrower focus that "could be useful to investors"
• Concern over the risk of litigation or regulatory action because preparers omit information previously provided. 
• Avoid using the term "relevance" 
• Watch the SEC's requirements, i.e. no point to reducing GAAP disclosures if the SEC imposes more specific requirements
• "The uses of boiler plate disclosures and reliance on checklists have inundated both the public and private sector as the volume and complexity of reporting requirements have increased significantly over the years. We believe having the flexibility to apply professional judgment will substantially reduce unnecessary disclosures."
• "We believe that preparers' judgment should instead be focused on what is material to the company based on a set of flexible disclosure requirements. Enabling flexibility, based upon materiality, would result in the right balance of providing relevant information while maintaining comparability."


• "Disclosure overload and complexity are the two aspects of financial reporting that financial statement users and preparers, large or small, agree on: There is too much of both."

This will be interesting to watch over the next few years. Don't expect a quick reduction in disclosures for this year's 10-Ks!

 

 

Significant vs Material

Often the terms “significant” and “material” are used interchangeably. This can course a lot of confusion. The SEC once took a company to task asking why they used this explanation of a contingency:

“You disclose...that you do not expect the ultimate conclusion of any of the proceedings to which you are a party to have a “significant adverse effect” on your financial statements and you have not disclosed the contingent liabilities associated with these claims either because they cannot be “reasonably” estimated or because such disclosure could be prejudicial to the conduct of the claims. Please revise your future filings...to more clearly confirm that you believe the ultimate conclusion of any of the proceedings to which you are a party will not have a “material” adverse effect to your results of operations, cash flows, or financial position.


Why the distinction between "material" and "significant"? To help with understanding the difference between "significnant" and "material" , the following comes from a paper on the IASB 2008 Annual Improvements Process, Comment Letter Analysis:

Significant vs Material

As mentioned above...some respondents asked for further clarification of the Board’s intentions in changing material to significant.

According to paragraph 30 of the Framework:

“Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements. Materiality depends on the size of the item or error judged in the particular circumstances of its omission or misstatement. Thus, materiality provides a threshold or cut-off point rather than being a primary qualitative characteristic which information must have if it is to be useful.”

“Significant, on the other hand, is not a defined term in IFRSs but is used throughout IFRSs to denote the degree of importance or relevance, eg significant costs (IAS 16) significant increase in turnover rates (IAS 19), significant period of time (IFRS 2).”

“Some respondents questioned whether it is possible to have a material change in the number of employees that is not significant. The staff notes that it is not meaningful to say there is a ‘material’ change in the number of employees in IAS 19 since the standard does not require that number to be disclosed in the financial statements.”

Clear as mud?

Friendly Accounting at Facebook

This post is courtesy of the Accounting Onion


U. S. Senator Carl Levin recently spoke on the Senate floor, referencing the discrepancy between tax and accounting treatment of stock options in the (then upcoming) Facebook IPO:


"According to its filings, when Facebook goes public, Mr. [Mark] Zuckerberg plans to exercise options to purchase 120 million shares of stock for 6 cents a share. Mr. Zuckerberg's shares, obviously, are going to be worth a great deal more than 6 cents, a total of about $7 million; they will apparently be worth more than 600 times as much, something in the neighborhood of $5 billion.


Here's where the tax loophole comes in. Under current law, Facebook can – perfectly legally – tell investors, the public, and regulators that the stock options he received cost the company a mere 6 cents a share – that's the expense shown on the company's books. [This is wrong – see later.] But the company can also – perfectly legally – later file a tax return claiming that those same options cost the company something close to what the shares actually sell for later on – perhaps $40 a share. And the company can take a tax deduction for that far large [sic] amount. So the books show a highly profitable company – profitable, in part, because of the relatively small expense the company shows on its books for the stock options it grants to its employees. But when it comes time to pay taxes, to pay Uncle Sam, the loophole in the tax code allows the company to take a tax deduction for a far larger expense than they show on their books. …


Now, the end result is that a profitable U.S. corporation – a success story – could end up paying no taxes at all for years, even decades."
To Levin, the Facebook IPO is a dramatic illustration of an inequitable "loophole" in the tax law. As Levin and Sherrod would have it, Facebook's tax deduction for using stock options to compensate executives – as opposed to any other form of compensation – would be essentially zero (that's probably a little dramatic on my part, but the point is the same); yet, Zuckerberg's tax liability when he exercises the options could be somewhere in the area of $3 billion.


The strong implication of Levin's narrative is that the extra amount of expenses would have wiped out every dollar of Facebook's reported net income that it had ever 'earned.' On top of that, there could be other outstanding options held by Zuckerberg and other employees extending way down the organization, which are going to have the same effect on future reported net income.


Which brings me to my second question: For all practical purposes, could Zuckerberg be taking Facebook public at this point in time with no history of profitability, perhaps negative shareholders' equity, and perhaps no hopes for earnings for some for years to come?


My inclination is to say "no," but I can only speculate. So, I will answer that question with another question: Since the FASB's rules understate the economic cost of options granted to employees, did the FASB provide a perverse incentive to Facebook to grant more options (or at terms overly favorable) to employees than it should have?


If one accepts the maxim that "what gets mismeasured gets mismanaged," then the answer to that question should be "YES." The stock option problem lies not with the tax rules that eventually recognize the full cost of the options to shareholders, but with the financial reporting rules that allowed Facebook to grant options without recording their full cost.


Surely, the senators can see that different accounting rules would have wrought different compensation policies from Facebook. Senator Levin would not have had a story to tell and Mark Zuckerberg would be a few billion dollars poorer.


Footnote: It is my distinct pleasure to provide Senator Levin (and his staff) with yet another accounting lesson. The amount of expense to be reported by Facebook is not, as the senator claims, the exercise price of the options (i.e., 6 cents per share). Assuming that the options were issued without any intrinsic value, then their "grant-date present value" (i.e., the amount upon which periodic option expense is measured) could end up being more or less than 6 cents per share. Although this technical correction to Senator Levin's story it doesn't fundamentally change the message, it once again reveals a lack of understanding that makes one question if Senator Levin has an adequate grasp on the issues.

IFRS Update

Comprehensive IFRS Update, courtesy of AICPA

SEC decision on IFRS is at least a few months away
The Securities and Exchange Commission staff will need a few more months to produce a final report on International Financial Reporting Standards, SEC Chief Accountant James Kroeker said Dec. 5 at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments in Washington. SEC members are not expected to make a determination on the use of IFRS for reporting by U.S. public companies until the staff's work is complete.

 Comment letters support IFRS, call for more convergence work: The Securities and Exchange Commission said comment letters in response to a staff paper called "Exploring a Possible Method of Incorporation," issued in May, expressed support for global accounting standards. But commenters also wanted the International Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to make more progress on joint standards-setting projects before International Financial Reporting Standards are adopted as the U.S. standard.

 AICPA advises IASB to complete work on conceptual framework
Richard Paul, chairman of the AICPA's Financial Reporting Executive Committee, advised the International Accounting Standards Board in a letter to complete its work on a conceptual framework, including a presentation and disclosure framework. This framework will guide the board as it continues to develop International Financial Reporting Standards. The letter was sent in response to a request for feedback when the IASB issued its Agenda Consultation 2011 in July.

FASB, IASB reach tentative decisions on aspects of lease accounting
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board announced progress in their ongoing, high-profile convergence project on leases. Although an exposure draft hasn't been released, the boards reached tentative decisions regarding cancelable leases, and revenue recognition and disclosure for lessors with leases of investment property. They also reached an agreement on how to require banks to book losses on loans earlier than they do now. The boards will release the revised joint proposal on impairment in 2012, with the standard likely to be effective in 2015.

FASB, IASB issue new disclosure requirements on offsetting
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board issued on Dec. 16 common disclosure requirements on the effect or potential effect of offsetting arrangements on a company’s financial position. The new rules will require companies to disclose gross amounts subject to rights of set-off, amounts set off in accordance with the accounting standards followed, and the related net credit exposure, according to the IASB.

Key accounting-policy decisions are mired in uncertainty
Details about whether and how International Financial Reporting Standards will be incorporated into the U.S. financial reporting system remain unclear, as Securities and Exchange Commission officials say they are still a few months away from deciding. The SEC has floated a "condorsement" approach, although the AICPA has urged the agency to give companies the option to adopt IFRS as issued by International Accounting Standards Board. Meanwhile, leaders of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the IASB say the current convergence project model is likely to end when the priority projects are completed.

Revised FASB proposal could change revenue-recognition timing
The timing of revenue recognition for certain companies could be affected by revised accounting proposals from the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board. The new rules also would bring other changes, such as increased disclosure requirements. AICPA members can download an updated Revenue Recognition Accounting Brief from AICPA.org.

Amendments aim to clarify transition guidance for IFRS 10
InAudit.com (12/23)

IASB pushes mandatory effective date for IFRS 9 to 2015
InAudit.com (12/23)

How the switch to IFRS could affect M&A

The convergence of International Financial Reporting Standards and U.S. generally accepted accounting principles will have implications for the treatment of mergers and acquisitions, writes Brian Reed, CPA/CVA. For example, GAAP and IFRS take different approaches to measuring the fair value of business combinations, and in many cases, revenue is recognized sooner under IFRS. In general, IFRS offers fewer rules and less guidance.

IFRS allows banks to inflate profits, report says
Banks are using complex financial products to bolster profits under International Financial Reporting Standards, according to a report by the Adam Smith Institute that calls for changes. In particular, banks are able to recognize expectations of future income as current profits under IFRS.

IFRS rule led to misdiagnosis of financial crisis, U.K. group says
Flaws in the IAS 39 International Financial Reporting Standards rule kept U.K. and Irish banks from booking potential bad loans during the 2008 financial crisis, leading to losses totaling $236 billion, according to a report by a pension fund lobby group. The accounting rule led to misdiagnosis of the root problem as one of liquidity, rather than solvency, the report said.

Commission: U.K. local authorities handled switch to IFRS well
U.K. local authorities handled the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards well in 2010, the Audit Commission found. However, some filed late accounts because of the change, with 18 of the 457 local bodies without auditors' opinions by Oct. 31, compared with seven in 2010-11.

Ireland eyes new deadline for U.S. multinationals to use IFRS
U.S. companies operating in Ireland reportedly will have another five years before being required to prepare a second set of statements under either International Financial Reporting Standards or Irish generally accepted accounting principles, in addition to U.S. GAAP. A proposed law would allow U.S. companies to continue using U.S. GAAP until 2020. The measure is intended to encourage foreign businesses to invest in Ireland.

Official: Russia's public companies will switch to IFRS by 2013
Bloomberg (12/13)
 CPA Exam to be given in South America under AICPA deal with Brazil
Accounting Today (12/9)

Discover the IFRS Certificate Program from the AICPA
The AICPA's IFRS Certificate Program is a comprehensive curriculum of online training, research tools and practice aids designed to help CPAs understand, implement and apply International Financial Reporting Standards. Courses cover revenue recognition, leases, impairment, intangible assets, inventories, EPS and more.

Fix for IFRS XBRL Taxonomy Exposed

Both the U.S. GAAP and IFRS XBRL taxonomies have been revised and exposed for comment.

For those not familiar with XBRL, it is an open-source HTML-like language for tagging financial statements. Proponents claim that XBRL makes it easier for investors and analysts to compare financial results across companies and industries. XBRL is now mandated by the SEC for public companies to use in their financial filings. XBRL tags let users of financial statements electronically search for, assemble, and process data so the information can be accessed and analyzed by investors, analysts, journalists and regulators.

The 2012 U.S. GAAP Financial Reporting Taxonomy is expected to be finalized and published in early 2012. The proposed 2012 U.S. GAAP taxonomy and instructions on how to submit comments are available on FASB’s XBRL page.

As for the IFRS taxonomy, the IFRS Foundation has revised it taxonomy in response to regulators and preparers who wanted more extensions (additional sub-accounts) to the full IFRS XBRL taxonomy.

The IFRS XBRL taxonomy is used to help those filing IFRS financial statements electronically to tag the information with identification tags, also known as “concepts.” Currently, the IFRS taxonomy includes all of the core concepts included in IFRS as issued by the IASB. However, preparers often need to provide more detailed financial information than is reflected by the core IFRS concepts.

To ensure that those creating and using electronic filings do not need to create their own extensions to the IFRS taxonomy, the IFRS Foundation has created an “extension taxonomy” by analyzing and drawing from common practice. For instance, although IFRS requires the disclosure of an analysis of expenses, IFRS does not include a prescriptive listing of all of the possible categories of expenses. The common-practice taxonomy includes concepts for the most commonly used types of expenses, such as “sales and marketing.”

The interim taxonomy released on Thursday completes the first part of a project to address this issue, by providing about 350 extensions for the most common concepts used in the financial statements.

The common practice concepts are in line with IFRS requirements and will help to alleviate the burden on preparers and to increase the comparability between financial statements in accordance with IFRS that are electronically submitted.

Impairment Bucket List

No, it’s not a list of cool impairments that an accountant might calculate in his lifetime, if he or she had the time and luck.

Accounting standard-setters are working on a new method of categorizing impaired financial instruments.

The recent credit crisis has advanced a need for revision of the current model as large financial institutions did not agree with existing standards. Large banks, for example, claim that the existing standards result in a “pro-cyclical” result. That means that when times were good, they accounting rules made things look better, faster. And when times were bad, things looked bas faster. Or went to hell faster, as we saw in 2009/03. The rules also impact other sectors.

Credit Crisis Effects
In 2008, banks were following a system of incurred loss reporting, meaning assets were marked down, or impaired, only once their value had demonstrably fallen. Critics said this caused catastrophic shortcomings in financial early warning systems, meaning banks were unable to build up reserves for expected losses and were woefully unprepared when asset values suddenly went into freefall.

The IASB has developed a more forward-looking set of rules for calculating impairment.

“Three-Bucket Solution”

One approach, and the major one being advocated now, is called the three-bucket approach.

One pre-IFRS problem was earnings management, when banks would set aside provisions with little justification, only to release them in lean years to plump up earnings. Critics said this made it hard for investors to get a handle on banks' true financial positions; from these concerns was born incurred loss reporting.

After the credit crisis, the accounting problem was how to permit the judgment essential for expected loss provisioning without paving the way for a potential return to earnings management.

The three-bucket approach aims to break down assets according to impairments, keeping a tighter rein on provisioning and giving analysts a clearer picture of financial health.

Into bucket one goes 'healthy' assets, those for which banks expect a reasonable return and need only make minimal provisions. Bucket two is reserved for assets with some level of impairment, but which are not completely useless, while bucket three is for assets that are undeniably 'bad'.

Throughout its life, the asset can move between buckets according to macro- and micro-economic triggers, hopefully allowing banks to make exactly the right provision at exactly the right time.

An example might be a bundle of mortgages. The bank grants the mortgages, and works out on the basis of historical data that it is likely to take an 80% return on them. It therefore makes provision for the 20% loss and the mortgage bundle sits in bucket one until a trigger makes re-evaluation necessary.

This trigger could be a macro-economic event such as falling oil prices, a contracting economy or rising unemployment. From this, the bank might deduce that a greater proportion of mortgage holders will struggle to pay and shift the asset bundle into bucket two, requiring higher provisions to be made.

For the mortgages to jump to bucket three, they must be demonstrably impaired, for example when the inhabitants of a town hit by unemployment begin defaulting on their mortgages. This is essentially an incurred loss model and would result in very high or 100% provisioning for the de-valued assets.

Unfinished business
Like all theoretical models, there is much uncertainty to be hammered out. What constitutes a bucket-moving trigger? When an asset is impaired, who decides whether the impairment is expected – therefore already provided for – or unexpected, meaning more cash should be set aside? How will auditors examine such a complicated model and will it really prevent earnings management if banks are determined to do it?

A number of question exist, and will need to be ironed out prior to implementation.

Giving a Rodent's Posterior about IFRS

I love the way that the author introduces this article:

Anyone Who Gives a Rat’s Behind About IFRS Needs to Mark July 7 on Their Calendars
By CALEB NEWQUIST

Cause there’s gonna be a roundtable.

The Securities and Exchange Commission staff announced today that it will sponsor a roundtable in July to discuss benefits or challenges in potentially incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers.

The July 7 event will feature three panels representing investors, smaller public companies, and regulators. The panel discussions will focus on topics such as investor understanding of IFRS and the impact on smaller public companies and on the regulatory environment of incorporating IFRS.

“We must carefully consider and deliberate whether incorporating IFRS into our financial reporting system is in the best interest of U.S. investors and markets,” said SEC Chief Accountant James Kroeker. “This roundtable will provide an excellent opportunity for investors, preparers, and regulators to provide the SEC staff with valuable information that will help the Commission in its ongoing consideration of incorporating IFRS.”

See you there. If you manage to recover from your July 4th meat sweats, that is.

XBRL and IFRS Mess

As a result of a series of missteps and lack of coordination, companies that file financial statements in the United States following IFRS may be getting a break on their first XBRL filing.

The SEC have acknowledged that it would be impossible for foreign private issuers, filing with the SEC following IFRS, to file in XBRL, because the SEC has yet to approve the XBRL taxonomy that IFRS filers should follow. Foreign private issuers (“FPI”) filing quarterly “voluntary” 10-Q filings are the first group of the third and final wave of companies coming under SEC rules to file in the XBRL for the first time.

For example a calendar year FPI in this group files its 30 June 2011 Form 10-Q on its Monday 10 August 2011 due date. The company would have until Tuesday 8 September 2011 to file its first XBRL exhibit under Form 10-Q/A. No grace period would be available for its 30 September 2011 Form 10-Q. For a FPI not filing voluntarily on domestic forms, its annual report on Form 20-F or Form 40-F for its year ended on or after 15 June 2011 will be the first SEC report required to include XBRL data. So a calendar year filer in this group would file its annual financial statements in XBRL format by its filing deadline in 2012.

To provide financial statements in XBRL according to SEC's rules, companies must follow a taxonomy approved by the SEC. A taxonomy is a list of computer-readable tags in XBRL that allows companies to tag the thousands of bits of financial data that are included in financial statements and footnote disclosures. On March 25, the IFRS Foundation finalized a 2011 IFRS taxonomy that would be followed by IFRS issuers to file in XBRL. The SEC has not yet approved that taxonomy, and hasn't said when it expects to do so. An SEC spokesman said the IFRS Foundation is still working on the taxonomy. Previously taxonomies took about five weeks for SEC approval.

The SEC has relaxed its rules for filings stating: “We are of the view that foreign private issuers that prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB are not required to submit to the Commission and post on their corporate websites, if any, Interactive Data Files until the Commission specifies on its website a taxonomy for use by such foreign private issuers in preparing their Interactive Data Files,” Cross and Kroeker wrote. The letter gives no indication, however, of when the SEC expects to approve the IFRS taxonomy and therefore how that might impact the date for XBRL filing requirements.

IFRS Convergence Projects Delayed

The heads of FASB and IASB announced they will take “a few additional months” beyond their June target date to complete priority joint convergence projects on revenue recognition, leases, financial instruments and insurance. This is a reasonable development, and expected by most observers. The original convergence deadlines were optimistic and some thought that inferior standards would result if the projects were rushed. A few quotes below.

David Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB
Leslie Seidman, Chairman of the FASB

David Tweedie: “...if you were listed in the United States using IFRSs you had to reconcile to US GAAP, that showed where the differences were, and what we did was try to look through our standards and if FASB had a better standard, we should take it and vice versa. That was going to take forever so in 2006, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was instituted and that set out a different policy, namely that we should look at certain standards, and for each of these standards, if it was complex or out of date there was no point in trying to converge them otherwise we would just get a complex out-of-date converged standard when what we should really do is write a better one.” “...we have completed most of that program and it’s been a great success, the two sets of standards are much closer together and frankly IFRSs are much better quality than they would have been otherwise.”

Seidman: “We would never let a target date take priority over thorough and robust due process...so let me clarify any misunderstanding about the June 2011 date. It was always intended to be a target, not a deadline, and we always said that achieving the target was subject to the nature and extent of the feedback that we got on each of the exposure documents. At this point on each of the exposure documents we have received significant and very constructive feedback and we are in the process of working through those issues. The quality of the standards remains of the utmost importance. Every board member wants to issue high quality standards that we think are going to withstand the test of time.”

Tweedie: “We have been working on these now for some five years so this is hardly a rush job and what we have done, and I think this is a big change in standard-setting over the past couple of years, is we have gone out deliberately to get high quality in put in addition to that required by our due process. This extensive outreach is something that hadn’t been done to the extent that it is now. We get constant input, and we test these ideas as we finalize the standards.”

Tweedie: “...we would never release a standard before it is ready and ultimately it must be a high quality standard or you just can’t issue it.”

Seidman: “After evaluating the issues yet to be addressed we jointly concluded that, without extending the work out indefinitely, we all could benefit from a few more months to develop these standards, some of which really go to the core issues of many companies.”

Tweedie: “So as Leslie was saying there, we have decided to extend the timetable for a few additional months to enable us to check whether our conclusions will last the test of time. We are also mindful of the G20 target, we have been reminded of that many times over the last few years, and we intend to try to finish this convergence program by end of 2011. The June target has helped us to get there but at the same time it is clear that we need a little more time to check the conclusions, and to ensure that the standards are of the highest quality.”

Seidman: “Let me mention one other thing, we have yet to decide on the effective dates for these standards but we do want to reassure people that we will allow ample time for them to understand the requirements and to plan for an effective transition to the new standards once those decisions are made.”

Joint Proposals Push Toward IFRS/GAAP Convergence in Issues Affecting Banks

FASB and the IASB announced moves toward convergence of IFRS and GAAP through joint proposals on offsetting transactions and impairment of financial assets.

The two main changes are 1) an exposure draft released last week on a common approach to offsetting financial assets and financial liabilities. This would end a major difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 2) A supplementary document with a new impairment model for financial assets like loans managed in an open portfolio. The proposal would replace the incurred loss model with a more forward-looking expected loss model--a response to complaints in the financial crisis.

The issue with offsetting is that companies can, in some instances, report IFRS balance sheet figures that are 100 percent greater than their U.S. GAAP numbers. This is confusing to the global capital markets and the proposals would eliminate the difference.

U.S. GAAP would only net in more limited circumstances, with note disclosure of other netting arrangements in footnotes.

Offsetting/netting is required when company presents in net amounts on their balance sheet. As it stands now, financial assets and financial liabilities may show up on a balance sheet as one net amount, or as two gross amounts, depending on whether the balance sheet is in IFRS or U.S. GAAP.

The above netting arrangements cause the largest difference between balance sheets using IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Derivative assets and related liabilities are the most common area where this occurs. Balance sheets of financial institutions generally have the largest derivative positions.

The new proposed rules apply only when the right of setoff is enforceable at all times, including in default and bankruptcy, and the ability to exercise this right is unconditional—i.e. offsetting only occurs after a future event. A company must intend to settle net, i.e. with a single payment, or simultaneously. If all of these requirements are met, offsetting is mandatory. This would also change industry conventions.

The Exposure Draft is Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities [FASB Proposed Accounting Standards Update, Balance Sheet (Topic 210): Offsetting]. Comments are due April 28.

On Impairment, changes introduce an expected loss model that is more forward-looking in accounting for credit losses, and is said to better reflect the economics of lending decisions. IFRS and U.S. GAAP currently account for credit losses using an incurred loss model, which requires evidence of a loss (known as a trigger event) before loans can be written down.

“The FASB and IASB are seeking comment on the changes, i.e. whether they agree conceptually and whether the changes can be practically applied.

Some advocate that a more forward-looking approach to loan losses would have made loan provisions show up earlier than before, and may have held off or mitigated the credit crisis by giving earlier warnings about the health of financial institutions.

Comments on the document Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to the Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, are due April 1.

If you need a nap, the IASB is hosting a webcast on the impairment of financial assets proposal on Friday, Feb. 4, with sessions timed for Europe and the U.S. Also “FASB in Focus” has overviews on the new rules netting on FASB’s website and another FASB in Focus on the impairment model.

Best of 2010: Accounting

After creating an ambitious agenda for the year, the standard-setters had to play hurry up and wait.

Article by Marie Leone and David M. Katz, CFO.com US

In the realm of accounting, no one moved more rapidly this year than the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board. The two standard-setting bodies set forth an aggressive agenda that called for a dozen or so new rules to be issued by 2011.

Their aim was to complete their now eight-year-old convergence project and emerge with a single set of global accounting standards. But the effort was ambushed by reality — the global financial crisis and subsequent global recession; heated debates over controversial rulemaking decisions; the early retirement of FASB chairman Robert Herz; and the announced departure of IASB chairman Sir David Tweedie, slated for June 2011. (On December 23, the trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation announced that Leslie F. Seidman, acting FASB chairman since Herz's retirement, had been named chairman of FASB, effectively immediately.)

Accordingly, the rulemakers slowed down the convergence process in the latter part of 2010, vowing to issue only four newly melded standards at any one time. Still, they hope to finish a number of convergence projects by the end of 2011. That will be a prickly task, since those projects have shaken some fundamental tenets of business. They will, for instance, eliminate the concept of operating leases, rework revenue-recognition rules, do away with last-in-first-out inventory accounting, and expand the reach of fair-value accounting.

Meanwhile, the process of adopting private-company accounting standards ("little GAAP") in the United States began in 2010, and could eventually become the purview of a second standard-setting board. The debate concerning final decisions about little GAAP should come to a head in 2011 — just in time for the Securities and Exchange Commission's decision on whether or not U.S. publicly traded companies should abandon U.S. generally accepted accounting principles in favor of international standards.

"Taking the 'Ease' Out of 'Lease'?"
By doing away with operating leases, new accounting rules could bring billions of dollars back onto balance sheets.
"Shorter Agenda for Convergence"
FASB and the IASB have selected five priority projects to focus on – and hopefully push out by next year.
"One Step Closer to Little GAAP"
A blue-ribbon panel on private-company accounting standards recommends a separate GAAP for private companies.
"Technical Difficulties"
As the pace of accounting-rule changes intensifies, can IT systems keep up?
"A Relentless Pursuit of Global Rules"
Tom Jones, director of Pace University's international accounting center, looks forward to a world without local GAAPs.
"Debunking IFRS Myths"
Experts expose seven misconceptions about international financial reporting standards.
"After Eight Years at FASB, Herz Looks Back"
In an exclusive interview, Robert Herz talks about his legacy as chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
"One Size Gives Fits to All"
Financial executives say that proposed changes to revenue-recognition rules ignore real-world realities.
"Revenue Rules Could Cause Software Snags"
How much will ERP systems have to be tweaked to comply with FASB's new revenue-recognition rules?
"Without Hoopla, Fair-Value Rule Is Readied"
Among the ripple effects of the global credit crisis is the rewrite of the controversial fair-value accounting rule once known as FAS 157. The revised standard could be in place by the end of the year.

Fair Value Fight between FASB, IASB heats Up with Volcker Comments

The FASB vs IASB fight has heated up substantially following comments by Paul Volcker, an advisor to Barack Obama and former chairman of the US. Federal Reserve Board, and former Chairman of the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation. The FASB wants to expand the use of fair-value accounting to all financial assets, including loans and deposits. This concept is opposed byUS bankers and also somewhat by the IASB, which prefers a milder version of fair value accounting. The battle that is shaping up between opposing forces could determine how much capital banks are required to maintain, and accordingly would determine to some extent how much leverage a bank could utilize.

The FASB proposal could result in the largest U.S. banks writing down the value of their loan portfolios.

Volcker said that treatment of financial instruments has not been resolved because of political pressure. Volcker also said “When you have global corporations operating around the world, and analysts looking at them from around the world, you want one accounting standard.”

The two accounting bodies have worked diligently toward convergence of the two different sets of accounting rules for the past five years. Disagreements are most significant around fair value rules for financial instruments, including derivatives, and rules governing what companies have to consolidate on their balance sheets. Many issues are close to being resolved.

The FASB likes a version of fair value accounting that forces loans and bank deposits to be marked to market values as is already done for banks trading books. Theis would not necessarily affect earnings, since some fair-value adjustments can be recorded in other comprehensive income which goes directly to equity.

The IASB prefers an approach that allows financial assets to stay on the books at original cost if the assets are held to maturity, i.e. for the long term. The IASB says it has no plans to re- open discussion of fair-value accounting, however the FASB and the IASB may eventually move to a middle ground.

Volcker prefers the IASB approach on valuing financial instruments. “You can’t have everything at fair value,” Volcker, said--“I’m not in favor of fair valuing bank loans because we don’t know their fair value anyway. It’s not consistent with the basic business model of commercial banks.”

In a similar episode, a few months earlier, IASB bowed to European Union demands to relax its fair-value rules, letting banks move some assets to a different part of the balance sheet so they wouldn’t have to be marked to market values.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the most profitable U.S. securities firm, has said that banks hide losses on loans used to generate investment-banking fees. In a Sept. 1 letter to FASB, Goldman Sachs described how banks lend at below-market rates to win equity and debt-underwriting deals, a practice known as “lend to play.” Goldman Sachs executives have argued that the firm’s practice of marking assets to market value helped it prepare for the credit contraction earlier than rivals.

Like LIFO?

Below is a very informative article from CFO.comSucking the LIFO Out of Inventory

The government sees billions of dollars in potential tax revenue sitting on the shelves of company warehouses.

Explaining accounting to Congress is never easy. But last spring, Bill Jones, vice chairman of O'Neal Industries, says he witnessed a few "aha" moments as he went door-to-door on Capitol Hill to lobby against the elimination of "last-in, first-out" (LIFO) accounting.

As Ron Travis, O'Neal's vice president of tax, explained to members of Congress why the majority of companies use LIFO, "lightbulbs started going off," recalls Jones. Until then, he says, "they thought LIFO was just a funny-sounding acronym."

LIFO allows companies to calculate the cost of goods sold based on the price of the most recently purchased ("last-in") inventory, rather than inventory that was purchased more cheaply in the past and has been sitting on the shelf. That boosts the cost of goods sold, which lowers profits — and, thus, taxable income. LIFO is particularly important to companies that have slow-moving inventory — such as industrial manufacturers and distributors — and are therefore vulnerable to rising prices. O'Neal, a manufacturer and distributor of metals and metal products, has used LIFO for 63 years, almost as long as the method has been allowed for tax purposes (the Internal Revenue Service first sanctioned it in 1939).

"We normally replace every piece of inventory we sell with a higher-priced piece of inventory," explains Travis. "Under LIFO, all of the inflation that is built into our product is not recognized for tax or book purposes."

Jones and Travis breathed a sigh of relief last year when Congress quietly dropped plans to eliminate LIFO. But it didn't take long before the funny-sounding acronym was back in the taxman's sights. The 2011 federal budget proposed by the Obama Administration again includes a provision to repeal LIFO accounting. The government estimates that the move would boost federal coffers by $59 billion over 10 years.

Even if LIFO somehow survives another year of federal budgeting, it still faces the long-term threat of being wiped out if the United States adopts international financial reporting standards (IFRS), which do not allow LIFO. That would stop companies from using LIFO entirely, because companies that use the method to reduce taxable income reported to the IRS must also use it for financial reporting, rather than potentially more-flattering methods, such as FIFO (first-in, first-out) or average cost.

A Bad Match?
Companies like LIFO because it stifles inflationary effects by matching current expenses and current sales more closely than other methods. The accounting convention "protects us from having to pay taxes on what are not really profits," contends Jones. Indeed, proponents of LIFO — 120 of which have formed the LIFO Coalition to lobby against its repeal — don't consider the methodology a tax break. "There is an economic reason for using LIFO, and that is lost on the folks in Washington," says Beatty D'Alessandro, CFO of Graybar, a distributor of electrical and industrial components that has been using LIFO since the early 1980s. Without LIFO, he says, there is a "mismatch between what it's going to cost us to put inventory back on the shelf and what we bought it for six months ago, when it may have cost less."

To understand the mismatch, consider how LIFO works: Say, for example, that a company has an industrial compressor in its inventory that it bought for $5,000. It sells the compressor for $5,500, and replaces it in inventory for $5,200. From an economic perspective, the profit is only $300, not the $500 difference between the historic and current price. LIFO allows companies to use that "last-in" price to record $300 in taxable income. The remaining $200 in income is deferred until the company shutters its business and is forced to liquidate the inventory, at which time it strips off years of "LIFO layers." The $200 — the difference between the taxable income recorded under LIFO and another methodology — is referred to as the LIFO reserve.

In a liquidation, notes O'Neal's Travis, the sell-off of old inventory generates revenue to pay the taxes. But if LIFO is simply repealed, he says, then deferred taxes will be due without the benefit of any additional revenue. "In effect, the repeal of LIFO is going after our equity," the tax director says.

Under the Obama budget proposal plan, companies would be required to "true up" their retained earnings in the year they stop using LIFO, explains Jason Cuomo, a senior analyst with Moody's Investors Service. They would then make annual cash tax payments on the profits stored in the LIFO reserve over a 10-year period, beginning in 2012.

Graybar's D'Alessandro argues that LIFO accounting is a "timing issue," rather than a tax gimmick, and emphasizes that LIFO accounting reverses itself when demand drops. "You burn through LIFO layers as you burn through your inventory," explains D'Alessandro, who notes that Graybar reached lower-cost inventory layers last year as demand slowed. At that point, profits rose under LIFO accounting and the company had to pay more in taxes. The same is true when deflation sets in, says Scott Rabinowitz, a director in PricewaterhouseCoopers's national tax practice. As the price of replacement inventory drops, taxable income increases, and so does a company's tax obligation.


A Cash-Flow Issue
Not all companies agree with the mismatch theory. Proponents of FIFO, who tend to be retailers and manufacturers of fast-moving inventory such as electronics or perishable goods, say FIFO better reflects the current value of inventories. For example, in December, packaging giant Pactiv Corp. switched from LIFO to FIFO, telling investors that the change provides "better matching of sales and expenses." Officials at the company, which makes Hefty brand plastic bags, noted that this is particularly true during periods when the price of their primary raw material, resin, is volatile.

Under FIFO, they said, "the lag between resin-price changes and selling-price changes will be reduced by approximately two months."




Moreover, not everyone agrees that LIFO elimination would be such a dire event for companies with slower-moving inventory. The elimination of LIFO "is a cash-flow issue," argues Moody's Cuomo, who co-authored a recent report on the subject. His report, which examined 176 companies rated by Moody's that use LIFO, points out that larger companies with strong cash flows likely will weather the one-time charge of converting from LIFO to FIFO or another methodology without much problem (see the chart at the end of this article). That's because for the largest companies, the charge represents a small percentage of their annual cash flow. However, smaller companies with high LIFO reserves and low cash flows could run into problems.

But some large companies say the change would still hurt. Graybar, with $4.3 billion in revenue, reported a LIFO reserve of $107 million in its most recent 10-K. Assuming a 35% tax rate, and a single payment that is not stretched out over time, D'Alessandro estimates that Graybar's tax bill would amount to $37.5 million on the day it converted from LIFO to FIFO — or a $19 million tax obligation if the company switched to average-cost accounting. More important, a switch from LIFO could mean up to 500 fewer jobs, says the CFO, who figures that, on average, salary and benefits cost the company $70,000 per person. "If we pay it in taxes, we can't pay it in wages. It is as simple as that. [LIFO repeal] is an anti-employment move," insists D'Alessandro.

The demise of LIFO also could affect a company's net operating losses — the deferred tax asset that is recorded by a company and held to offset taxable income in the future. Rabinowitz notes that taking the LIFO reserve into income could reduce the amount of NOL carryforwards.

The sting of LIFO repeal also will be felt by smaller companies that don't have robust information-technology systems, says Stephanie Anderson, a managing director at consultancy AlixPartners. That's because sorting and valuing layer after layer of LIFO inventory is a complex task. That kind of "unwinding" is mandatory before an accurate valuation can be recorded for book and tax purposes. Anderson says companies may also need to hire more cost accountants to ferret through the inventory layers.

Is the End Near?
The brightest hope for LIFO proponents is the possibility that the accounting method could yet survive. It is too early yet to tell how strong industry pushback will be on the Administration's proposed repeal, but lobbying efforts have stopped it before. Similarly, if the Securities and Exchange Commission does make IFRS the accounting system of the land, nonpublic companies won't have to use the standards. Indeed, if the IRS itself isn't the force behind a LIFO prohibition, it might even prove willing, as it has in the past, to water down conformity regulations requiring that certain methods be used consistently for both tax and financial reporting.

Perhaps the biggest wild card affecting the government's decision will be the economy. "It's always a terrible time to look at repealing LIFO," says Jones, "but right now it's just another nail in many corporate coffins."

Marie Leone is senior editor for accounting at CFO.

FASB in Midst of "Religious War" on Fair Value

This is a posting on a blog called "Finance Director" about a n article by Mario Christodoulou, Accountancy Age, 22 Jul 2010.

Attempts to bring in fair value standard "almost like a religious war" board member claims.

A member of the US accounting standard setter has likened attempts to bring in fair value to a “religious war” in a speech with regulators this week.

Lawrence Smith, board member with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), made the comment in a panel discussion with US audit regulator, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, in the midst of a far ranging consultation on the accounting principle.

FASB is pushing ahead with plans to bring in a full fair value measurement model which would force banks to value their financial assets at market prices. The proposals are being fought by banks who argue the rules would add volatility to balance sheets.

Smith said he is not a "fair value zealot", but was swayed to the model when he saw the effect on deposits.

"That’s what threw me over the edge," he said.

“Some people have advised us that we shouldn’t say this, but I’ll say it – fair value, to some of us, is almost like a religious war out there and we are trying to deal with that as best we can.”

FASB is attempting to harmonise its accounting rules with international standards, despite clear differences in their approach to fair value. Whereas FASB’s proposal measures assets measured at fair value, the international model allows some loans to be valued at amortised cost.

The contentious proposals was passed by a single vote, with the five-member FASB board split 3-2.

Smith’s comment will likely widen the gap between FASB’s proposal and its international counterpart, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Failure to reach agreement on the standard will undermine US attempts to adopt international rules.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission is currently investigating the impact of international accounting rules on US markets. A key part of their final decision will depend on the level of convergence between US and international accounting rules, with fair value being among the most important project on the table.

Retailers Must Make Major Adjustments for New Lease Accounting

Accounting rules on leases are sure to change in the near future. International and U.S. standard-setters have both introduced new proposed standards are likely to be finished in 2011 and take effect in 2013.

The New York Times quotes the SEC as stating that $1.3 trillion in leases will be added to public company balance sheets.

The standards will add significant liabilities to balance sheets and may jack up expenses as well.

All leases will be affected, including those currently classified as operating leases and fully expensed as there is no grandfathering clause when the rule takes effect.

The standards require companies to record as a liability the cost of rent over the remaining term of the lease and record as an asset their right to use the space.

This could have diverse impacts, including weakening companies in the eyes of investors and activating debt covenants with lenders.

It could also affect credit ratings. Ratings agencies say they already take into consideration rent obligations by using a multiplier on operating lease payments to arrive at an estimate of capital lease obligations. However the new standard requires significant additional disclosures that could provide readers of financial statements with additional information about corporate leases, possibly not known before, and possibly damaging to credit capacity.

The thrust of the change is part of the trend to limit off-balance-sheet activity. The standard-setters received almost 300 comment letters commenting on the proposal.

Certain companies with high debt loads may be adversely affected by adding new debt to their balance sheets. Also impacted heavily will be large retailers that may have thousands of premises leases, as well as commercial banks with multiple branches. Tracking leases and analyzing them to convert them to on-balance-sheet status may be problematic.

The standards may have the impact of persuading companies to purchase rather than lease real estate, to avoid either the ongoing administrative burden of analyzing and classifying and accounting for capitalized leases, or to have more conventional and possibly lower-cost debt on their balance sheets.

Companies may also opt for shorter leases as they will have less debt on their balance sheets that if they have longer terms.

Renewal options may become less popular. The new rules require that if a company expects to execute a renewal option, they must account for the lease as if it included the option, in many cases doubling or tripling the face/undiscounted amount of the lease liabilities and adding debt to balance sheets.

Contingent rents, based on a percentage of sales will trigger additional debt as well, based on estimated sales over a lease term. Most retailers in shopping malls fall under these types of structures. Retailers forced now to estimate sales way into the future, and to reassess these estimates at every (quarterly).

On the other side of the lease arrangements, landlords will also change their accounting. Landlords would record as a liability their obligation to provide space and record as an asset the rents they expect to receive. Under the new standard the rents will be recorded partly as interest income and partly as a reduction in the obligation to provide space.